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Tender offers in South America: Do they convey good news to the market?
ABSTRACT
Different studies in developed capital 
markets have found positive abnor-
mal returns of at least 15% during the 
announcement date of a tender offer. 
Although there are almost no studies 
for South American stock markets, 
some studies reported positive ab-
normal returns, ranging from 25% to 
50%, related to the announcement of 
the ﬁ  rst tender offer. In this study one 
argues that estimated positive abnor-
mal returns in emerging markets are 
high because studies have assumed a 
completely segmented capital market 
by applying the market model with a 
local stock market index. By allowing 
for partial integration among five 
South American emerging markets, 
one shows that there are in fact 
positive abnormal returns previously, 
during, and after the announcement 
date of the ﬁ  rst tender offer. How-
ever, the positive abnormal return 
associated to the announcement 
date is in the order of 8%. A slightly 
higher abnormal return is obtained 
using a market model that accounts 
for partial integration and downside 
risk. These results prompt towards 
a lower positive abnormal return in 
the sample of South American ﬁ  rms 
studied.
*  The authors are grateful to Alex Saldaña and Carlos Barrientos for outstanding research assistance.14
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RESUMEN
Diferentes estudios realizados en 
mercados de capital desarrollados 
han revelado tasas de retorno posi-
tivas inusuales de por lo menos 15% 
durante la fecha de anuncio de la 
oferta pública de adquisición de ac-
ciones. Aunque casi no se han llevado 
a cabo estudios sobre los mercados 
bursátiles en Sudamérica, algunos 
estudios han reportado tasas de re-
torno positivas inusuales en un rango 
del 25% al 50%, las cuales están rela-
cionadas con el anuncio de la primera 
oferta de adquisición. En el presente 
estudio, se argumenta que las tasas 
de retorno positivas inusuales esti-
madas en los mercados emergentes 
son altas porque los estudios se han 
basado en un mercado de capitales 
totalmente segmentado aplicando el 
modelo de mercado y utilizando un 
índice del mercado bursátil local. Al 
considerar la integración parcial en-
tre los cinco mercados emergentes en 
Sudamérica, se demuestra que efec-
tivamente existen tasas de retorno 
positivas inusuales antes, durante 
y después de la fecha de anuncio de 
la primera oferta de adquisición. Sin 
embargo, el retorno positivo inusual 
asociado a la fecha del anuncio se 
encuentra en el orden del 8%. Uti-
lizando un modelo de mercado que 
considere la integración parcial y el 
riesgo a la baja, se obtiene una tasa de 
retorno inusual ligeramente mayor. 
Estos resultados señalan una menor 
tasa de retorno positiva inusual en la 
muestra de las empresas sudameri-
canas incluidas en el estudio.
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There have been numerous studies in 
the ﬁ  eld of tender offers and on the 
necessary premia to get corporate 
control in the process of takeover 
in developed capital markets, but 
almost none for South American stock 
markets. International evidence, 
mainly in the United States, shows 
that there are high positive abnormal 
returns for the target company at the 
moment of announcing the tender 
offer.
The objective of this study is to show 
that positive abnormal returns related 
to the ﬁ  rst tender offer are in fact 
lower than previous estimates if one 
allows capital markets to be partially 
integrated instead of completely 
segmented. Recently, Stulz (1999), 
and Bekaert and Harvey (2003) 
have shown that after financial 
liberalization in emerging markets, 
their expected returns must fall 
because their relative volatility with 
respect to the world volatility must 
be higher than their correlations 
with the world market returns. Stulz 
(1999) has shown that this is the 
necessary and sufﬁ  cient condition for 
globalization to reduce to reduce the 
risk premium of an small country (in 
this case an emerging market). This is 
the case even when emerging markets 
are more sensitive to world events due 
to their ﬁ  nancial liberalizations.1 To 
the extent that local and world events 
play a meaningful role in explaining 
stock returns in emerging markets 
there will be less variation to explain 
and therefore abnormal returns must 
be lower than otherwise.
In this research, one shows that 
accounting for partial integration 
among five South American stock 
markets yields positive abnormal 
returns, which are lower than the ones 
estimated by previous studies. In order 
to show this, one uses 17 tender offers 
that have been accomplished during 
the period 1998-2002 across ﬁ  ve South 
American stock markets (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela). 
In particular, one is interested in 
answering the following research 
questions: Do target South American 
ﬁ  rms offer positive abnormal returns 
around the announcement date of 
their ﬁ  rst tender offer in a situation 
of partial integration? Does one ﬁ  nd 
evidence of information leakage 
during the days previous to the 
announcement date of the ﬁ  rst tender 
offer? Is there evidence of stock 
market overreaction?2
In particular, an hybrid multifactor 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
is used as a market model. This is 
in fact just one way to represent a 
situation of partial integration. As 
pointed by Bodnar et al. (2003), a 
situation of partial integration is 
very difﬁ  cult to represent because 
in this situation every investor 
has access to an incomplete but 
well-deﬁ  ned list of stocks. In order 
to specify this situation one needs 
information about all individuals and 
available securities for them. Hence, 
it may be possible that a situation 
1.  In fact, the emerging market covariance and correlation with the world return may increase due to the 
ﬁ  nancial liberalization.
2.  We only discuss the results related to target ﬁ  rms because we found no evidence of positive or negative 
abnormal returns in the sample of bidder ﬁ  rms (not reported).
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of partial integration does not 
correspond to the hybrid multifactor 
CAPM. However, since the hybrid 
multifactor CAPM is a strange 
mix of the full-integration and the 
full-segmentation CAPM, it may be 
taken as a ﬁ  rst approximation to a 
situation of partial integration.
The paper has been divided into six 
sections. The next section discusses 
the existing empirical evidence 
concerning tender offers, while 
the third section reviews the main 
aspects related to event studies. The 
sample criteria and data description 
appears in the fourth section, while 
the methodology and results are 
discussed in the ﬁ  fth section. The last 
section concludes the paper.
2. TENDER OFFERS: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE
A takeover refers to transfer of 
control of a firm from one group 
of shareholders to another group 
of shareholders. The controlling 
shareholders of the bidder company 
wish to acquire the company to 
the controlling shareholders of a 
target company. This change in the 
controlling interest of a corporation 
can be accomplished either through a 
friendly acquisition or an unfriendly, 
hostile, bid. A hostile takeover (with 
the aim of replacing current existing 
management) is usually attempted 
through a public tender offer (Harvey 
and Mongerson, 2006).
A tender offer is a general offer 
made publicly and directly to a ﬁ  rm’s 
shareholders to buy their stock at a 
price well above the current value 
market price (Harvey and Monger-
son, 2006).
The empirical evidence concerning 
tender offers is vast, so this section 
summarizes the most relevant studies 
for the purposes of this research.
Dodd and Ruback conducted one of 
the earliest studies concerning tender 
offers in (1977). These authors studied 
172 companies traded at the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) covering the 
period between 1958 and 1976. The 
objective of their study was to analyze 
the premium obtained by target 
companies on the announcement date 
of a tender offer and whether this 
premium was different for successful 
and unsuccessful bids. Using the 
market model, these authors found 
that abnormal returns of target 
companies acquired via successful 
bids was about 21%, while it was 
19% for the case of unsuccessful bids. 
Later on, Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
conducted several studies between 
1977 and 1983 and concluded that 
takeover in their sample have offered 
positive abnormal returns ranging 
between 16% and 30%.
Through the years several authors 
have found similar results for the 
NYSE and the NASDAQ. In this 
sense, Bredley et al. (1983) reported 
a premium ranging between 23% 
and 60% for target companies at 
the NYSE. Jarrel et al. (1988) 
studied 663 cases of successful 
tender offers between 1962 and 
1985 and came to the conclusion 
that positive abnormal returns for 
target companies averaged 30%. 
Furthermore, Asquith (1988) found 
a positive abnormal return of 19% 
on NASDAQ target companies 
10 days prior to a tender offer 




Zingales (2000) studied the magnitude 
of the average premium paid for 
voting shares in countries where 
such information is available. Such 
average premium varies enormously 
from country to country. In most of 
them it ranges between 10% and 
25%, with Israel (45%) and Italy 
(82%) as the main exceptions. This 
variation can be explained by the 
characteristics of each country, with 
a probable effect on the ability to 
derive private gains from company 
control. Zingales concludes that as 
both local legislation and supervision 
improve, the premia on controlling 
stock will tend to be lower. Another 
interesting result was obtained by 
Moloney (2002) who found that, 
on average, the bidder company 
rewards the target company between 
15% and 50% over the market price 
of the target company prior to the 
announcement of the tender offer. He 
concluded that there is a high positive 
abnormal return in the case of hostile 
bids and that there is a low positive 
abnormal return when ownership is 
highly concentrated and absorbed.
Although there are almost no studies 
for South American emerging 
markets, an interesting piece of 
evidence was offered by Fuenzalida 
and Nash (2003) whom studied 14 
Chilean companies during the years 
1995 and 2002. They conclude that 
there is evidence of positive abnormal 
returns on the announcement date of 
a tender offer of about 26%. Besides, 
these positive abnormal returns are 
lower in the case of public companies 
operating under the Tender Offer 
Law in Chile.3
3. ISSUES IN EVENT STUDIES
In conducting event studies there 
are several issues that one needs 
to account for. In this section, one 
reviews the main stages of the 
procedure. Five issues are discussed: 
event deﬁ  nition, selection criteria, 
estimation of abnormal returns, 
estimation of model parameters and 
tests for detecting abnormal returns. 
The following subsections will discuss 
each one in turn.
3.1 Event deﬁ  nition
The best results with an event 
study are obtained when the exact 
date of the event is identified. 
In order to do this it is crucial 
to identify the event subject at 
hand: e.g. the announcement date 
of a merger, an acquisition, an 
earnings announcement, a change 
in the debt rating, the adoption of 
an ISO standard, etc. Then, the 
estimation and event windows must 
be determined (See Figure 1).4
Using the same notation as Camp-
bell et al. (1997), one deﬁ  nes t=0 as 
the event date when the announce-
ment occurs, the interval [T1+1, 
T2] is the event window with length 
L2=T2-T1-1, while the interval 
[T0+1, T1] is the estimation window 
with length L1=T1-T0-1. When the 
3.  Fuenzalida and Nash (2004) have shown that the Tender Offer Law in Chile has depressed the Stock 
Exchange because it forces the acquisition of 100% of a given stock package when 2/3 of the stock owner-
ship is reached. This situation generates an incentive to turn diffusely held ﬁ  rms into closely held ﬁ  rms 
and eventually leave the Stock Exchange.
4.  All Figures and Tables are own elaboration unless otherwise stated.
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Figure 1: Event study windows
study is being conducted with daily 
data, the estimation window usually 
is between 100 and 300 trading days 
(Peterson 1989).
The length of the event window usually 
depends on the ability to date precisely 
the announcement date. If one is able 
to date it with precision, the event 
window will be short and the tests to 
detect abnormal returns will be more 
powerful. Nevertheless, the length of 
the event window normally ranges 
between 21 and 121 days (Peterson 
1989). Note that the event window 
includes the event announcement day, 
which occurs at t=0.
3.2 Selection criteria
This step is certainly a very important 
one since it is easy to introduce a 
selection bias in the definition of 
the sample of ﬁ  rms to be studied. In 
emerging markets the main tradeoff 
that one must make is between 
having quantitatively more ﬁ  rms in 
the sample, but with several ﬁ  rms 
subject to thin trading or having less 
number of ﬁ  rms, but actively traded. 
In the ﬁ  rst case, one needs to use a 
procedure to test for abnormal returns 
in the presence of thin trading, while 
in the second case one has to avoid as 
much as possible any selection bias in 
the sample.
This tradeoff is due to the low number 
of actively traded or liquid stocks in 
emerging markets. For example, the 
percentage of actively traded stocks, 
as a fraction of the total number of 
traded stocks per year was between 
5% and 19% at the Lima Stock 
Exchange (LSE) during the period 
1991-2002 (Mongrut 2006).
Thin trading or non-synchronous 
trading means that whenever a 
market shock occurs, it will not be 
incorporated immediately into the 
price of a thin traded stock because 
it is not being traded. If one does not 
consider the effect of thin trading, there 
will be a serious bias in the moments 
and comoments of asset returns (for 
example, the beta parameters of thin 
traded stocks will be lower than the 
beta parameters of actively traded 
stocks). The reason for this is that 
time series of stock prices are taken 
to be recorded at time intervals of one 
length when in fact they are recorded 
at other irregular time intervals 
(Campbell et al., 1997).
Different ways to deal with the 




suggested by Scholes and Williams 
(1977), Dimson (1979), and Cohen 
et al. (1983) in the context of market 
risk estimation. Each one of them 
tried to give an estimation of the 
market risk parameter (beta) in the 
presence of thin trading. However, 
as reported by Brown and Warner 
(1985), there is little to gain by 
using the procedures of Scholes and 
Williams (1977), and Dimson (1979) 
in testing abnormal returns.
What happens if one only includes 
few firms actively traded in the 
sample? A small number of firms 
will not represent a problem because 
parametric tests statistics used to 
detect abnormal returns converge 
to their asymptotic values rather 
quickly (Brown and Warner 1985). 
This implies that even in the presence 
of abnormal returns that do not obey a 
normal distribution, one can still use 
parametric tests invoking the Central 
Limit Theorem. The real problem is 
the potential for a selection bias. In 
our study, there could be observed and 
unobserved common characteristics 
among these few ﬁ  rms that make 
them more prone to become a target 
for a tender offer. In this sense, one 
cannot draw inferences for the total 
population of tender offers. This issue 
will be addressed again in the ﬁ  fth 
section.
3.3 Estimation of abnormal 
returns
There are mainly three models to 
estimate abnormal returns: the 
constant-mean return model, the 
market model, and the market 
adjusted model.5 Nevertheless, 
in this research only the market 
model is used. In the following 
sections one discusses the market 
model in tow alternative scenarios: 
full-segmentation of capital markets 
and partial integration.
3.3.1 The market model with 
full-segmentation
The market model with full-segmen-
tation states that:
L
i,t i,t i í m,t ˆ ˆ AR R( R ) 
 A 
 B (1)
i,t AR : Abnormal return of stock ￿i￿ in period ￿t￿
Realized return of stock ￿i￿ in period ￿t￿ i,t R : 
Return of a local market index in period ￿t￿
L
m,t R : 
5.  Brown and Weinstein (1985) have concluded that there is little value to gain in using a multifactor model 
(such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory-APT) versus the market model. Furthermore, Dyckman et al. (1984) 
have concluded that the market model is more suitable for detecting abnormal performance.
6.  The data corresponding to stocks was obtained from Economatica for each country in US$ dollars. One 
also uses the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Stock Market Indexes.
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The market model adjusts for the 
stock return for the local systematic 
risk in estimating the abnormal 
return. In this way, the variance of 
the abnormal return will be reduced 
because one is removing the portion 
of the return that is related to the 
local market index. Popular choices 
for the market index are the local 
equally weighted market index and 
the local value weighted market 
index. However, the former index 
is more likely to detect abnormal 
returns because it has been shown 
that is more correlated with market 
returns (Peterson 1989).
Usually, the model parameters 
(alpha and beta) are estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) during 
the estimation window. The OLS 
estimation of equation (1) relies 
on two crucial assumptions: the 
variance of the abnormal return is 
constant through time and there is 
no time series correlation among the 
abnormal returns. Hence, the model 
implies absence of heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation. Unfortunately, 
these assumptions are usually not 
met. In particular, thin trading could 
generate times series dependence or 
serial correlation.
If there is heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation in abnormal returns 
it is better to use a different method to 
estimate the model parameters such 
as the Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditionally Heteroskedastic Model 
(GARCH). The GARCH (1,1) is 
expressed in the following way (2):
LL
i,t i,t i i m,t
i,t i i,t 1 i,t
2
i,t i,0 i,1i , t1 i , 2 i , t1









 A  B
R E
W W E W
 
Where:
Furthermore, event clustering within 
the same time period could generate 
another problem: cross-correlation 
among abnormal returns of different 
stocks. Although, Brown and Warner 
(1985) have noted that, unless the 
potential bias is substantial, it is 
better to assume cross-sectional 
independence, it is wise to avoid event 
clustering otherwise the statistical 
power of the tests will diminish.
Another problem is a variance increase 
ue to the event announcement. 
This also generates the problem of 
heteroskedasticity. If one uses the 
variance of the estimation window 
instead of the variance of the event 
window, the tests statistics will 
yield too many rejections of the 
null hypothesis that the cumulative 
average abnormal return is equal 
to zero. A way to deal with this 
problem is by using the standardized 
cross-sectional test proposed by 
Boehmer et al. (1991).
The OLS estimation of the model 
parameters also relies on the as-
sumption that abnormal returns 
are normally distributed. There is 
considerable evidence that daily 
stock returns (raw returns), and 
their respective abnormal returns, 
are right skewed and leptokurtic (fat 
tails) (Fama 1976). In emerging mar-
kets stock returns are considerable 
more skewed and leptokurtic than 
in developed markets (Bekaert et al., 
1998). Although, the parametric tests 
statistics converge rather quickly to 
a normal distribution, it is advisable 




using a procedure that allows for the 
non-normality in the cross-section of 
abnormal returns, such as the Theil 
procedure proposed by Dombrow et 
al. (2000) or to use a non-parametric 
test to test for abnormal returns. In 
particular, one may use two nonpara-
metric tests: the sign test analyzed 
by Cowan (1992) or the rank test 
proposed by Corrado (1989).
3.3.2 The market model with 
partial integration
Emerging markets are not completely 
segmented, but rather partially 
integrated (Bodnar et al., 2003). 
In such a situation a better way to 
specify abnormal returns is by using 
a hybrid version of the market model 
where local and world events play a 
role in explaining stock returns:
LL WW
i,t i,t i i m,t i m,t ˆˆ ˆ AR R ( R R ) 
 A  B  B
Where:
W
m,t R :  Return of a global market 
This model can be estimated using 
OLS or the GARCH procedure, but 
given the high volatility of emerging 
markets it is better to use the later 
procedure instead of the former 
to estimate the model parameters 
within the estimation window.
As previously stated, stock returns 
in emerging markets are non-normal 
because they are usually right 
skewed. In other words, investors 
in these markets face substantial 
downside risk (Estrada 2000). In 
this sense, Estrada (2002) proposed a 
modiﬁ  cation of the traditional Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in order 
to allow for downside risk, the result 
was the D-CAPM. This model states 
that what matters to expected returns 
in emerging markets is the downside 
systematic risk or downside beta as 
opposed to the total systematic risk or 
beta from the traditional CAPM.
The ex-post version of a hybrid 
D-CAPM can be used to estimate 
abnormal returns. This version is 
expressed in the following way:
(3)
index in period “t”.7
L DL L
m i,t i,t i i i m,t ￿ ￿ AR Min R R ( Min[(R R ),0] ¨· 
 
 A  B 
 ª¹
W DW W
m im , t ￿ Min[(R R ),0]) B 
 (4)
In this version one is considering 
partial integration and downside 
risk simultaneously. Furthermore, 
given the non-normality of emerging 
market stock returns, the parameters 
of model 3 and 4 can be estimated 
using the GARCH procedure.
7.  The Global Market Index is the one provided by the MSCI.
3.4 Tests for abnormal returns
Once abnormal returns have been 
estimated for each stock, using one or 
more models, one has to test whether 
abnormal returns are statistically 
significant or not. This task can 
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be performed for each day or for a 
time interval during the event win-
dow. The test for each day aims to 
test whether individual cumulative 
abnormal returns are statistically 
signiﬁ  cant, while the test for a time 
interval aims to determine the sta-
tistical significance of cumulative 
average abnormal returns during a 
selected time interval for a group of 
stocks.
Two main situations can arise: only 
one event occurs per stock or each 
stock is subject to the occurrence of 
many events within the selected time 
interval. In both cases, one may use 
parametric and nonparametric tests 
statistics. The choice of one or more 
test statistics depends on the situation 
faced by the researcher. In emerging 
markets the situation usually is 
far from ideal, so the best way to 
proceed is by using a combination of 
parametric and nonparametric tests.
Parametric tests use standardized 
abnormal returns to align event 
period abnormal returns’ volatility 
with its estimation period volatility 
and to prevent stocks with large 
volatility to dominate test statistis 
(Boehmer  et al., 1991). The 
standardized abnormal return is 










SARi,t:  Standardized abnormal re-
turn for stock “i” within the event 
window
Si,t: Standard  error
Now, one can cumulate abnormal 
return for each stock within the time 




i1 2 i , t
tt
CAR t ,t SAR

¤
The standard error involves information 
from the estimation window and from 
the event window because it must 
include the standard error of the 
estimate (from the estimation window) 
and the standard error of the forecast 
(from the event window).
Parametric tests can be deﬁ  ned to 
test for abnormal returns per each 
stock at any given date, but in this 
research one is interested in detecting 
aggregate abnormal performance for 
a give period or time interval. In this 
sense, one must deﬁ  ne parametric 
and nonparametric test accordingly.
In order to aggregate abnormal 
returns across several stocks and 
events for a selected time interval 
[t1, t2] (within the event window), the 
ﬁ  rst step is to aggregate the individual 
abnormal returns considering N 
events. The average 
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The next step is to aggregate the 
average abnormal returns through 




























¤  and  () () () () 12 12 CAAR t ,t .N 0,Var CAAR t ,t %
The variance of CAAR assumes 
that different event windows do 
not overlap to each other (i.e. no 
event clustering), so one may avoid 
covariance terms. Then, in order to test 
the null hypothesis that cumulative 
average abnormal returns are zero, 
one uses the following test statistic 













CAAR t ,t CAAR t ,t
J






¨· ¨ · ª¹ ©¸
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Where : 	 1 J.N0 , 1 % (9)
Whenever one considers that 
cumulative abnormal returns vary 
across securities, it is suitable to 
give equal weight to the realized 
cumulative abnormal return of each 
security. This is what J1 does.
Another possibility is to consider 
constant abnormal returns across 
securities. In this case it is more 
appropriate to give more weight to the 
securities with the lower abnormal 
return variance so that the power 
of the test will improve. In order to 
construct a test consistent with this 
possibility one must ﬁ  rst construct 
a test statistic for each security 
using the standardized cumulative 
abnormal return within the selected 













The standardized cumulative ab-
normal return has a Student-T 
distribution with a null expectation. 
As long as the length of the estima-
tion window increases (L1>30), the 
distribution for this test converges 
to the standard normal distribution 
(Cowan and Sergeant 1996). Now, by 
aggregating expression 10 through 
the number of events within the 







SCAAR t,t SCAR t,t
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SCAAR(t1,t2): Average standardized 
cumulative abnormal return for the 
event window [t1,t2]
(11)
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Brown and Warner (1985) report 
that the Patell’s test (expression 
10) is well speciﬁ  ed under a variety 
of conditions. Furthermore, there 
is little to gain by using a more 
complicated test unless there is a 
serious problem like an increase in 
the variance of abnormal returns 
(induced by the event) or unusually 
high cross-correlation. If the variance 
of abnormal returns increases on the 
event date the Patell’s test rejects 
the null hypothesis more often than 
the nominal signiﬁ  cant level (Cowan 
and Sergeant 1996). In other words, 
(12)
() () () ()
2 NN
12 i 12 i 12
i1 i1
N1
Var SCAR t ,t SCAR t ,t SCAR t ,t




 ©¸ §¶ ª¹
∑ ¤
event-related variance increases 
cause these tests to report a price 
reaction more often than expected 
(Cowan 1992). In order to avoid this 
problem, one may use the Boehmer 


















Due to the fact that the BMP test works 
with data from the event window, 
it can consider any event-induced 
variance and it is not affected by the 
problem of thin trading. Furthermore, 
the test is essentially unaffected by 
the presence of event-date clustering 
(Boehmer et al., 1991).
Concerning the problem of 
non-normality, one may try to tackle 
this problem using a nonparametric 
test, which does not rely on this 
assumption. Here, there are two 
choices either the generalized sign test 
or the rank test from Corrado (1989). In 
general the rank test is more powerful 
than the generalized sign test in 
detecting abnormal returns, however 
in the presence of event induced 
variance different authors favor the 
generalized sign test. Besides, given 
that in the presence of non-normality 
both test are well speciﬁ  ed and equally 
powerful, in this research one has 
favor the generalized sign test over 
the rank test.
The generalized sign test aims to 
determine whether the number of 
securities with positive cumulative 
abnormal returns in the event win-
dow exceeds the expected number 
in the absence of abnormal security 
performance (Cowan 1992). The ex-
pected number of positive abnormal 
returns along 214-day estimation 
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In the above expression, the dummy 
variable “D” takes the value of one 
whenever there is a positive abnor-
mal return for security “i” on day “t”, 
otherwise is zero. Now, if one deﬁ  nes 
“ω” as the number of securities in the 
event window with a positive cumula-25
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tive abnormal return, one may write 
the generalized sign test statistic (S) 












Where: 	 4 J .N0 , 1 %
These four tests (three parametric 
and one nonparametric) will be 
used in the empirical part of this 
research.
4. SAMPLE CRITERIA AND DATA 
DESCRIPTION
Table 1 shows the total number of 
acquisitions in six South American 
capital markets. Only a small fraction 
of the total number of acquisitions 
(13)
fulfilled our sample criteria. The 
criteria to select a particular 
acquisition were based upon the 
following ﬁ  ve requirements: the type 
of acquisition must be a tender offer, 
only target firms that have been 
subject to a ﬁ  rst tender offer during 
the period 01/01/1998 to 12/31/2003 
were selected, each ﬁ  rm in the sample 
must have a market presence of at 
least 60% during the estimation 
period and non-missing observations 
for the event period, there must be no 
other news besides the announcement 
of the tender offer during the analyzed 
period, and securities with overlapping 
event periods are excluded from 
the analysis unless they belong to 
different industries.
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Argentina 61 63 79 26 8 21
Colombia 17 22 13 3 6 8
Brazil 94 96 137 77 40 69
Chile 15 43 47 24 10 13
Peru 7 20 17 7 6 15
Venezuela 6 14 17 11 8 4
Table 1: Total number of acquisitions in South American stock markets
Source: Bloomberg
The above period of analysis was 
chosen because no acquisition ful-
ﬁ  lled our sample criteria during the 
three previous years: 1995-1997. The 
requirement of a market presence 
of at least 60% during the estima-
tion period was meant to include as 
much ﬁ  rms as possible. However, as 
Table 2 shows only one ﬁ  rm had such 
low market presence, the remaining 





The indicator of presence is deﬁ  ned 
as follows:
Where:
q: Number of days in which there 
were at least 1 trade of the stock 
within the selected period
d:   Total number of days within the 
selected period
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Chile Santa Isabel 99,6% 14% 01/15/1998
Chile Banco Bhif 97,7% 8% 08/10/1998
Chile Enersis 99,8% 21,7% 01/25/1999
Chile Campos Chilenos 90,3% 51% 01/27/1999
Chile Gener 100% 95,7% 11/03/2000
Chile Laboratorio Chile 98,8% 100% 05/22/2001
Peru  Telefonica del Peru SAA 100% 60,6% 01/13/2000
Peru  Banco Continental Peru 85,6% 9.80% 11/27/2002
Peru  Cia Minera Atacocha SA 61% 41,3% 05/29/2001
Peru  Luz del Sur S.A 99,6% 25% 08/05/1999
Venezuela
 Cia Anonima Nacional 
Telefonos de Venezuela 
- CANTV
100% 43,2% 08/29/2001
Venezuela  Electricidad de Caracas 99,6% 73% 05/02/2000
Argentina
 Telefonica Holding 
de Argentina SA
82% 9.30% 09/04/2000
Argentina  YPF SA 100% 15% 01/06/1999
Argentina  Banco Rio de la Plata SA 96% 25.50% 02/10/2000
Brazil
 Empresa Bandeirante 
de Energia SA
97% 37,01% 07/06/2000
Brazil Teleste Celular 86% 60,1% 06/16/1999
Table 2: Description of the sample
Source: Bloomberg and Economatica
Missing quotes were treated in the 
way suggested by Brown and Warner 
(1985): the missing quote and the 
succeeding period quote were removed 
from the analysis. This method 
attains the greatest sample size 
without affecting the identiﬁ  cation 
of abnormal performance (Peterson 
1989). The remaining two criteria were 
established to avoid any confounding 
effects and any cross-correlation due 
to event clustering, respectively.
Applying the above selection criteria 
yield only 17 companies, which are 27
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reported in Table 2. Two observations 
are in order: there was no ﬁ  rm in 
Colombia able to fulﬁ  ll the sample 
criteria, and there was no ﬁ  rm able 
to fulﬁ  ll the sample requirements 
in 2003. Therefore, our results only 
apply for the period 1998-2002.
Given the small sample size cause 
of concern is the possibility for a 
selection bias. In particular, one may 
wonder if there are observed and 
unobserved common characteristics 
among these few ﬁ  rms that make 
them more prone to become a target 
for a tender offer. However, as Table 2 
shows, it seems to be no selection bias 
due to observable variables. Indeed, 
target ﬁ  rms are based in different 
countries, the percentage acquired 
varies widely, bidder ﬁ  rms come from 
different countries (not reported), 
and target ﬁ  rms belong to different 













5. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
This section explains briefly the 
different steps used in this research 
to determine the daily abnormal 
performance of stock returns. The 
event under study is the announcement 
of a tender offer from the bidder ﬁ  rm 
to the target ﬁ  rm. In this sense, one 
is interested in the announcement 
date of the tender offer instead of the 
effective date where the acquisition 
was made.
Around the announcement date 
reported in Table 2, one has deﬁ  ned 
an estimation period of 214 days 
and an event period of 30 days 
where 20 days were defined prior 
to the announcement date and 10 
8.  The total number of acquisitions is based on the effective date of the acquisition instead of the announce-
ment date of the acquisition.
Figure 2: Target ﬁ  rms by sector
Tender offers in South America: do they convey good news to the market?
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9.  It was not possible to work with a bigger number of days for the estimation period because the number 
of stocks would fall. Conversely, a lower number of days for the estimation period would damage the 
signiﬁ  cance of the estimation of the model’s parameters.
10.  Other models such as the constant-mean return model and the market-adjusted model were not used 
because there is no way to account for differences in market integration.
11.  In the presence of substantial currency risk, it would have been better to use the International Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) analyzed by Bodnar et al. (2003).
days after this date. Hence, there 
are 245 days per stock including the 
announcement date.9
The market model was used to 
estimate daily abnormal returns 
per stock.10 However, due to the fact 
that one is working with target ﬁ  rms 
from different countries, one needs 
to control for differences in the level 
of market integration across the ﬁ  ve 
capital markets considered. Hence, 
it has been decided to use a hybrid 
version of the market model with 
and without downside risk. In other 
words equations 3 and 4 were used to 
estimate daily abnormal returns. The 
hybrid market model does not include 
currency risk, so one implicitly 
assumes that the inﬂ  uence of this 
risk upon stock prices is small.11
In order to account for the possibility 
of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation among abnormal returns, 
equations 3 and 4 were estimated 
using the GARCH (1,1) procedure. 
Furthermore, confounding effects were 
avoided, as well as event clustering 
unless stocks belong to different 
98 99 00 01 02 Total
YPF SA 1 1
Banco Rio de la Plata SA 1 1
Telefonica Holding de Argentina SA 1 1
Teleste Celular 1 1
Empresa Bandeirante de Energia SA 1 1
Santa Isabel 1 1
Banco Bhif 1 1
Enersis 1 1
Campos Chilenos 1 1
Gener 1 1
Laboratorio Chile 1 1
Luz del Sur S.A 1 1
Telefonica del Peru SAA 1 1
Cia Minera Atacocha SA 1 1
Banco Continental Peru 1 1
Electricidad de Caracas 1 1
CANTV 1 1
Total 2 5 6 3 1 17
Table 3: Tender offers per year
Source: Bloomberg and Economatica29
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industries. Table 3 shows potential 
event clustering in years 1998-2001, 
but from Table 2 one may see that only 
in years 1999 and 2001 there is event 
clustering. However, it is unlikely to 
ﬁ  nd cross-correlation because in 1999 
and 2001 ﬁ  rms belong to different 
industries and in 2001 they even 
belong to different countries.
Following the suggestions by many 
authors, one has used parametric 
and nonparametric tests were 
used to detect aggregate abnormal 
performance. Three parametric tests 
were used (J1, J2 and J3) and one 
nonparametric test (J4). The first 
two tests were used because they 
have some ability to detect abnormal 
performance even with small sample 
sizes, while the BMP test (J3) was used 
to account for event-induced variance. 
The generalized sign test (J4) served 
to account for non-normality in the 
cross-section of abnormal returns.
A major concern in working with a 
small sample size is the possibility 
that one firm (an outlier) drives 
the results. Figures 3 and 4  the 
cumulative abnormal returns for each 
ﬁ  rm in the sample according to the 
two models used to estimate abnormal 
returns (in both ﬁ  gures ﬁ  rms were 
ordered from left to right). It is not 
true that positive abnormal returns 
are present only in one or two ﬁ  rms. 
In both Figures, more than 80% of 
the ﬁ  rms report positive cumulative 
abnormal returns (See Table 3).
Another important problem is the 
possibility for an event-induced 
variance increase. From Figures 5 and 
6, there seems to be an event-induced 
variance, so one needs to account for 
this problem. It is also remarkable 
the similarity among the results of 
both speciﬁ  cations with and without 
downside risk. However, as expected, 
abnormal returns with the partial 
integration model with downside risk 
are higher than the ones obtained with 
the model without downside risk.
Tables 4 and 5 report the statistical 
significance of average cumulative 
abnormal returns. Parametric tests J1 
and J2 show statistically signiﬁ  cant 
positive abnormal returns ranging 
between 3.1% and 8.2% for one 
day before and one day after the 
announcement of the first tender 
offer. This result isrobust across both 
speciﬁ  cations. Furthermore, the BMP 
test (J3) is able to detect positive 
abnormal returns ranging between 
0.18% and 8.2% for different windows 
mainly before the announcement 
date. However, abnormal performance 
due to information leakage is of low 
magnitude because abnormal returns 
range between 0.18% and 0.48%. 
It is worth noting that the partial 
integration model with downside 
risk yield more signiﬁ  cant abnormal 
returns than the partial integration 
model without downside risk.(See 
Table 4-5).
The performance of the partial 
integration market model with 
downside risk even improves when the 
generalized sign test is used. In this 
case, the generalized sign test is able 
to detect not only positive abnormal 
performance before, but also after the 
announcement date of a tender offer. 
Nevertheless, the market overreaction 
is of low magnitude (0.17%).
In general, the results show a positive 
abnormal return of about 8% for the 
announcement date of a tender offer 
and low positive abnormal returns 
for the days before and after the an-
nouncement date.
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Days after announcement date Days after announcement date Days after announcement date
Days after announcement date Days after announcement date Days after announcement date
Days after announcement date Days after announcement date Days after announcement date
Days after announcement date Days after announcement date Days after announcement date
Days after announcement date Days after announcement date Days after announcement date
Days after announcement date Days after announcement date
AR(%) (a) Atacocha (b) Banco Río Plata (c) Bandeirante AR(%) AR(%)
AR(%) (d) Banco Bhif (e) Campos Chilenos (f) CAVTV AR(%) AR(%)
AR(%) (g) Banco Continental (h) Electricidad Caracas (i) Enersis AR(%) AR(%)
AR(%) (j) Gener (k) Laboratorio Chile (l) Luz del Sur AR(%) AR(%)
AR(%) (m) Santa Isabel (n) Telefónica Argentina (o) Telefónica Perú AR(%) AR(%)
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(k)  Laboratorio Chile
(l)   Luz del Sur
(m) Santa Isabel
(n)  Telefónica Argentina
(o)  Telefónica Perú
(p)  Teleste
(q)  YPF
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Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns by ﬁ  rm. Market Model - GARCH - Down-
side beta
(a) Atacocha









(k)  Laboratorio Chile
(l)   Luz del Sur
(m) Santa Isabel
(n)  Telefónica Argentina
(o)  Telefónica Perú
(p)  Teleste
(q)  YPF
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Figure 5: Average abnormal returns Sample of 17 ﬁ  rms
(a) Market Model - GARCH (a) Market Model - GARCH - Downside 
beta
Figure 6: Average cumulative abnormal returns Sample of 17 ﬁ  rms






(t1,t2) CAAR (%) J1 J2 J3 J4
(-10,10) 0.54294 0.70305 0.71237 3.09040*** 1.01504
(-5,5) 1.08343 1.29441* 1.18900 2.78262*** 3.04512***
(0,0) 8.18108 139.07835*** 138.45045*** 1.24471 3.04512***
(-1,1) 3.12194 2.91974*** 4.17551*** 1.55123* 1.52256*
(-10,-1) 0.17821 0.30173 0.43948 1.97609** 0.00000
(-5,-1) 0.46707 0.89619 0.79781 1.87257** 0.00000
(1,10) 0.14386 0.23240 0.41322 -0.01160 0.50752
(1,5) 0.28026 0.52116 0.93904 -0.79183 -0.50752
Table 4: Statistical signiﬁ  cance of Average Cumulative. Abnormal Returns 
(CAAR). Partial integration Market Model - GARCH (1,1) (N = 17 ﬁ  rms)
*   Signiﬁ  cant at 90% level of conﬁ  dence
** Signiﬁ  cant at 95% level of conﬁ  dence
*** Signiﬁ  cant at 99% level of conﬁ  dence
Source: Personal compilation
(t1,t2) CAAR (%) J1 J2 J3 J4
(-10,10) 0.56032 0.72580 0.76032 3.57386*** 1.97122**
(-5,5) 1.10574 1.32020* 1.25122 3.00266*** 3.44964***
(0,0) 8.21012 139.57206*** 138.94193*** 1.24350 3.44964***
(-1,1) 3.14759 2.94533*** 4.31509*** 1.56082* 1.97122**
(-10,-1) 0.18783 0.31902 0.46372 2.15453** 0.98561
(-5,-1) 0.47546 0.91376 0.81022 2.37543*** 1.47842*
(1,10) 0.16783 0.26999 0.49184 0.40454 1.47842*
(1,5) 0.31515 0.58017 1.06125 0.19473 0.00000
Table 5: Statistical signiﬁ  cance of Average Cumulative. Abnormal Returns 
(CAAR). Partial integration Market Model - Downside risk GARCH (1,1)
(N = 17 ﬁ  rms)
* Signiﬁ  cant at 90% level of conﬁ  dence
** Signiﬁ  cant at 95% level of conﬁ  dence
*** Signiﬁ  cant at 99% level of conﬁ  dence
Source: Personal compilation
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6. CONCLUSION
Consistent with the previous 
literature, the results obtained show 
that tender offers in South America do 
convey good news to the market in the 
way of positive abnormal performance 
for the announcement date. However, 
the reported abnormal performance 
(8%) is substantially lower than the 
one reported by the studies reviewed 
in the introductory part.
The reason for the above result lies 
in the different views about South 
American stock markets. In this 
research, one believes in the view of 
partially integrated capital markets 
instead of the full-segmented view. 
In this scenario stock returns are 
also sensitive to world events, so 
abnormal returns cannot be as large 
as in the case of a full-segmented 
capital market.
The results also show traces of 
information leakage and market 
overreaction. This is consistent 
with previous literature about stock 
market efﬁ  ciency in South American 
stock markets. For instance, Mongrut 
(2002) ﬁ  nds short-term overreaction 
at the LSE. However, the information 
leakage seems more robust across 
model specifications than market 
overreaction.
The later result is not strange 
because the days previous to the 
announcement date of the tender offer 
are contaminated by the negotiations 
between the target and the bidder 
company, and the speculation about 
the acquisition. Hence, it is likely 
that some information is ﬁ  ltered to 
the market.
Although this study has presented 
evidence of positive abnormal 
performance surrounding the first 
announcement of a tender offer, 
several questions remain unanswered: 
How one may improve the model 
used in this study to characterize a 
situation of partial integration? How 
do abnormal returns relate to the ﬁ  rm 
ownership concentration? How do they 
relate to successful and unsuccessful 
bids? These questions add to a large 
list of unsolved issues in emerging 
markets that one hope are going to be 
addressed in the near future.
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